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stimulated -by decisions such as Vodrey v. QyigleyS7 to will property to
their natural parents and -blood relatives if they wish them to share in the
adopted person's estate at his death.
ROBERT N. COOK
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Workmen's Compensation decisions in 1957 were neither o dynamic
nor far-reaching as in 1956.1 Most decisions involved procedural mat-
ters important to the particular case but not of great significance to the
general law of workmen's compensation.
Decisions on dependency to determine death benefits involved both
children and wives in the past year. In Miller v. Industrial Commission
an illegitimate posthumous child, which the decedent workman had not
acknowledged, was held not to be a dependent child. Two cases involv-
ing widows portray workmen's compensation issues with interesting do-
mestic relations undertones. In the first3 the widow claimant had not
been divorced from her first husband. She sought death benefits when
her second husband was killed while working. The workman himself
had also been married previously. The court held that the widow claimant
was not a lawful widow for the purposes of workmen's compensation
without proof of both her own divorce from her first spouse and the
divorce of her worker husband from his prior spouse.
In the second case the widow claimant offered a common-law mar-
riage relationship as proof of her dependency to the decedent workman.
Actually the workman had been married to another woman prior to this
relationship, but she had been missing for over seven years before the
common-law marriage was consummated. Proof of an attempt to locate
this first wife was offered. However, no proof of divorce or death was
offered so no legal common-law marriage could be established. This
impediment barred the widow claimanes right to death benefits.4
Two methods of improper procedure occurred in the former re-hear-
ing procedures. First, in Firth v. Industrial Commission5 after the record
had been certified by the Industrial Commission to the common pleas
court, the court sought to remand the record to the Commission for
further re-hearing procedures. The appellate court held that the Com-
mission had no jurisdiction to hear additional re-hearing testimony un-
der the situation; hence, the common pleas court had no jurisdiction to
remand.
' 75 Ohio L. Abs. 65, 143 N.E.2d :162 (Ct. App. 1956) (next of kin of adopted
parent inherit property from adopted person and not natural aunt of adopted person).
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In a second case, the complex issues of an accidental injury and the
causal relation between the accident and the death of the workman re-
quired the trial court to re-read medical testimony on possibility and
probability to the jury. This was done after the jury had deliberated
several hours. Claimant's original objection to this re-reading was sub-
sequently withdrawn. The jury's verdict against claimant was affirmed
on the grounds that no prejudicial error had occurred.6
The statute of limitations required two interpretations last year. In
State ex rel. Allied Wheel Products v. Industtial Commission7 the em-
ployer sought a mandamus to set aside an additional award granted to
the claimant because of employer's violation of a specific safety require-
ment. The employee had filed his claim within the statutory period of
two years. He based the claim, however, on a regulation not in effect
until after the accident. The claimant was allowed to amend his claim
to include the prior but almost identical regulation after the expiration
of a two-year period from the time of the accident. An abuse of discre-
tion by the Industrial Commission had not occurred; mandamus was
denied.
A more important aspect arose in State ex rel. Koval v. Indastrd
Commission.8 An employee filed a claim two years after the accident.
He sought a writ of mandamus to force its acceptance. The employee
claimed that the self-insuring employer had paid employee's doctor bill
for medical services arising out of the accident. The claimant contended
that this was an acknowledgment of the accident by the employer so the
two-year statute should run from the date of payment. The claim was
filed within this later period. The appellate court dismissed the claim
stating that the determination of what was a compensable injury should
not be based upon a self-insuring employer's payment of a medical bill
but rather on an administrative or judicial decision.
Improper reception of evidence proved to be prejudicial error in two
cases last year. The Industrial Commission counsel read letters and en-
tries from the Veterans Administration to the common pleas jury which
contradicted claimanes statement of his good health. During the rehear-
'Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n., 164 Ohio St. 297, 130 N.E.2d 807 (1955) and
Dripps v. Industrial Comm'n., 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956) were
landmark cases discussed in the 1956 Survey, 8 WEST. REs. L. REv. 396 (1957).
2 165 Ohio St. 584, 138 N.E.2d 672 (1956).
'Evans v. Industrial Comm'n., 166 Ohio St. 413, 143 N.E.2d 705 (1957).
'White v. Industrial Comm'n., 102 Ohio App. 236, 142 N.E.2d 549 (1956).
'145 N.E.2d 215 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
"Ball v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 142 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio Cr. App. 1955).
S166 Ohio Sr. 47, 139 N.E.2d 41 (1956).
141 N.E.2d 306 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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ing before the Commission such letters and entries were excluded on
claimant's objections. They were not included in the certified record for
the jury's consideration in the common pleas trial. A new trial was
ordered because of their improper admission during that trial. 9 When
the Commission violated its own rule, to receive only such evidence on
review as was in the record at the time the award was made, the appel-
late court by mandamus restored a 40% permanent partial award. To
receive a physician's affidavit as new evidence in the review hearing and
reduce the original 40% award to 22% was declared illegal.10
The employment area received interpretation once again. Claimant
was denied an award because he was not working within the employment
area in Lanzam v. Beatty." He was tearing down a 'barn used in con-
nection with defendant's -farm some two miles away. Some evidence
existed that defendant owned the barn but not the land. This action was
held not to be within the usual course of the farmer's -business so the injury
incurred was not compensable.
The customary liberal interpretation of the workmen's compensation
law was expressed in a conflict of laws case. Two New York employees
were temporarily in Ohio on the employer's business. One was killed in
an automobile accident while the other was driving. New York death
benefits were granted. Under New York law a wrongful death action
against the fellow employee was barred. Ohio permits such action under
a similar situation for its workmen. The appellate court allowed the
New York workman's dependent to follow the Ohio rule and to sue the
fellow workman for wrongful death.'2
Finally, in the procedural area, the Supreme Court upheld the major
legislative revisions in workmen's compensation administration adopted
in 1955. Since these changes were considered remedial in character, a
claimant under the amendments can be deprived of the right of certain
statutory attorney's fees in the administrative process.' 3
The customary cases involving accidental injury, proximate cause and
the hypothetical question also appeared last year.
Accidental injuries were considered not proved, and claims were re-
jected in three cases: first, when an employee testified that she felt a
"crack in her back" while doing heavy work which she had done before;' 4
'Woodard v. Industrial Comm'n., 139 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
" State ex rel Cox v. Industrial Comrn'n., 144 N.E.2d 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
"141 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
'Ellis v. Garwood, 143 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
'State Ex Rel. Michael v. Morse, 165 Ohio St. 599, 138 N.E.2d 660 (1956).
"'Jordan v. Ternstedt Division, General Motors Corp., 140 N.E.2d 343 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1956).
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second, when a decedent who died with lung cancer shortly after a leg
amputation allegedly necessitated by a fall 'but proved only by one wit-
ness who testified he saw decedent leaving an elevator in a "falling posi-
tion";15 third, when decedent suffered a fatal stroke on alternate theories
of either a fall or extreme heat which was not an unusual or unexpected
work hazard. 16
An unusual Supreme Court decision rejected proof of proximate cause
where proof of claimant's case alleging glaucoma caused by accidental in-
jury rested on probabilities based upon probabilities in Brecount v. The
Procter and Gamble Co.17 The cause of glaucoma is unknown medically.
The court majority compared a probability based upon probability to an
inference based upon an inference, both of which are inadequate for
legal proof. This case was certified from the court of appeals on the
issue of whether the trial jury in the common pleas court must be
charged on the necessity of determining a 25% eye disability as required
by the statute to permit recovery. Once certified, however, the high
court can render its decision on other issues. The percentage of disabil-
ity issue was resolved with the rule that the Commission, not the jury, is
responsible for disability determination; hence, the trial court should not
charge the jury on the issue.
No proximate causal relation existed according to the appellate courts
where a coronary occlusion was suffered while performing the usual work
in the usual manner,' 8 and where the usual smoke and steam were in-
haled after several panes of window pane were broken in the cab of
decedents crane being operated in the usual manner.19 A jury verdict
denying claimanes right to compensation was upheld when the decedent
fell at work, then died two years later from chronic myocardial degenera-
tion after three days of exhaustive psychosis. 20 A jury verdict granting
claimant the right to participate in the workmen's compensation fund
was also upheld when an unskilled worker slipped on an incline in a
grain elevator and testified himself, without a medical expert, as to a
back injury suffered in the sacroiliac region.21 The court did intimate
that where one segment of the body was accidentally injured resulting in
injury to another part or death, a medical expert's testimony would be
'Miller v. Industrial Comm'n., 145 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio Cr. App. 1956).
'Grimm v. Industrial Comm'n., 145 N.E.2d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
1166 Ohio S. 477, 144 NE.2d 189 (1957).
' Minnick v. Industrial Comm'n., 102 Ohio App. 525, 144 N.B.2d 227 (1956).
" Scuetra v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 144 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
" Leeper v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 144 N.E.2d 549 (Ohio Ct. App.
1955).
'
1Berry v. Industrial Conm'n., 142 N.E.2d 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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required to support the proximate cause issue. In this respect the court
was following Drakulich v. Industrial Commission.22
In Zelnka v. Industrial Com.ission, 23 a hypothetical question to a
medical expert was held improper by the Supreme Court with two judges
dissenting. The expert had not attended the decedent. The question was
based on assuming as true voluminous hospital records and X-ray photo-
graphs with many notations by attending physicians. The decedent had
suffered an ankle fracture followed by death from diabetes mellitus with
gangrene of the foot.
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.
137 Ohio St. 82, 27 N.E.2d 932 (1940). (Accidental injury to the back with
death from cancer one year later requires a medical expert's proof.)
0165 Ohio St. 587, 138 N.E.2d 667 (1956).
